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Axiomatic characterizations and a non- cooperative justification of the constrained equal benefits rule in airport problems
國立東華大學應用數學系
專 題 演 講
主講人：胡政成教授
國立成功大學經濟學系
講 題：Axiomatic characterizations and a non- cooperative justification of the constrained equal benefits rule in airport problems
時 間：99年11月12日(星期五)15:10-16:50
摘 要
We propose two properties, bilateral consistency and converse consistency, and study their implications, when imposed singly together with other properties, in airport problems. We show that the constrained equal benefits rule, which equalizes agents' benefits subject to no one receiving a subsidy, satisfies the two properties, and then base axiomatic arguments in favor of the rule on bilateral consistency or converse consistency. In addition, we use bilateral consistency and converse consistency as guides to design an extensive form game, and show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game is the contribution vector suggested by the constrained equal benefits rule. This result provides a non-cooperative justification of the rule.
上列演講地點於理學院A324會議室舉行
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