國立東華大學應用數學系

專    題    演    講

    主講人：Yukihiko Funaki 教授

                   School of Political Science & Economics, Waseda University

    講  題：Axiomatization and implementation of a discounted Shapley value.        

    時  間：101年3月9日(星期五)　16:00-17:30

    地  點：理學院A324會議室

摘   要

    In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium.
    The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property.

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