國立東華大學應用數學系

專    題    演    講

       主講人：Dr. Bara Kim (Korea University)

       時  間： 108 年 12月 27日 (星期五)  15:10-17:00

地  點：理工一館 A324

講  題：Nash equilibrium for an asymmetric lottery Blotto game with weighted majority

Abstract

We consider an asymmetric lottery Blotto game with two agents and n items, where both agents wish to maximize their probability of winning a majority value of all n items. Duffy and Matros (2015) showed that if there exists a Nash equilibrium, then the equilibrium is unique, and it is found in an explicit expression. They also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the cases of n = 3 and n = 4. We prove that the lottery Blotto game always has a unique Nash equilibrium for any value of n.

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